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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2-2(3)0) (1996).
ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in determining that there was new and

contemporaneous consideration given for payments made by Southern American
Insurance Company ("SAIC") to CSX Corporation ("CSX") prior to the liquidation of
SAIC?1
Standard of Review: Because the district court decided the issue on summary
judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass'n, 922 P.2d
8 (Utah 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
This case is governed by Utah Code Annotated Section 31A-27-321, which
provides in pertinent part as follows:
(l)(a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any
of the property of an insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor, for or on
account of an antecedent debt, made or allowed by the insurer within one
year before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or
liquidation under this chapter, the effect of which transfer may enable the
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor of
the same class would receive....
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the rehabilitator or
liquidator, if:
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of the transfer; [or]
(ii) the transfer was made within four months before the filing
of the petition;
This issue was raised below in cross-motions for summary judgment. (R. 615-628.)
1

(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under this
section for or because of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings,
In 1992, the Third Judicial District Court placed SAIC into liquidation and
appointed the Utah Insurance Commissioner as Liquidator. In 1994, the Liquidator filed
suit against CSX pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321. This statute allows the
Liquidator to recover certain preferential payments made to creditors prior to liquidation
so that funds can be brought back into the estate and equitably distributed to all creditors
in accordance with the Utah Insurance Code's statutory priority scheme. In this instance,
the Liquidator's action sought to recover, for the benefit of SAICs creditors and
policyholders, three payments totaling $308,000 that were made by SAIC to CSX prior to
liquidation.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the district court. On
April 3, 2001, the district court denied the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment
and granted CSX's motion for summary judgment. The district court ruled that CSX had
provided SAIC with new and contemporaneous consideration for the payments that SAIC
made to CSX, thereby providing CSX with a defense to the Liquidator's action under
Utah Code Annotated § 31 A-27-321. This is an appeal from the final judgment entered
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2

Statement of Facts,
1.

SAIC was a Utah insurance company that was placed into liquidation by

the Third Judicial District Court (the "Liquidation Court") on March 25, 1992, in the case
of in In re Southern American Insurance Co., Case No. 920901617, on March 26, 1992.
(R. 311, 312.)
2.

As part of its insurance business, SAIC issued three excess insurance

policies to CSX or its predecessors covering various liabilities and occurrences. (R. 312,
313, 322-330, 369-379, 380-388.)
3.

These three policies insured CSX and/or its predecessors for occurrences

between July 14, 1979, and July 31, 1982. (Id)
4.

On or about October 3, 1985, the predecessors of CSX filed two separate

complaints against SAIC based on the SAIC insurance policies. (R. 314, 315, 389-399,
400-443.)
5.

Also on or about January 11, 1990, the predecessor of CSX filed a third

complaint against SAIC based on the SAIC insurance policies. (R. 315, 316, 444-465.)
6.

The three lawsuits identified in the preceding paragraphs are collectively

referred to below as the "asbestos coverage litigation."
7.

In or about March of 1991, SAIC and CSX commenced settlement

negotiations for the asbestos coverage litigation, which continued over the next several
months. (R. 316, 466-467.)

3

8.

On or about October 14, 1991, a settlement letter (the "October 14, 1991

Settlement Letter") was circulated memorializing the settlement terms to which SAIC
and CSX had agreed. (R. 317,470-472.)
9.

The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter was executed by CSX on October

17, 1991 and by SAIC on October 25, 1991. (R. 317,470-472.)
10.

As memorialized in the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter, SAIC agreed

to pay $308,000 in three virtually equal monthly installments commencing on October
31, 1991 and ending on December 31, 1991. (R. 317,470-472.)
11.

SAIC made the following payments to CSX which were drawn on a

checking account SAIC maintained at Zions First National Bank:
Check No.

Check Amount

Check Date

035353
035437

$102,667
$102,667

October 28, 1991
November 26, 1991

035483

$102,666

January 2, 1992

These checks represent the subject matter of the present action. (R. 318, 512-514.)
12.

After receipt of the checks, they were endorsed and cleared SAIC's

checking account at Zions First National Bank on November 13, 1991, December 6, 1991
and January 16, 1992, respectively. (R. 318, 512-514.)
13.

The Liquidator of SAIC caused the Complaint commencing this action to

be filed on March 25, 1994, requesting that the $308,000 in payments be avoided as
preferential transfers pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 31A-27-321. (R. 318, 516521.)
4

14.

On February 2, 2000, CSX filed a motion for summary judgment on the

ground, inter alia, that the Liquidator's preference claim was barred by the new and
contemporaneous consideration defense. (R. 188-272.)
15.

On March 30, 2000, the Liquidator filed a cross motion for summary

judgment and for partial summary against CSX on the grounds that the elements of a
preferential transfer existed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, and that CSX had not
established any defenses to the preferential action. (R. 273-309.)
16.

On March 5, 2001, the District Court heard oral argument on the cross

motions for summary judgment and on March 12, 2001, it entered a memorandum
decision pursuant to which it granted CSX's motion for summary judgment and denied
the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and for partial summary judgment. (R.
615-628.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court erred in holding that CSX satisfied the elements to

establish the "new and contemporaneous consideration" defense to the Liquidator's
preference action. The statute requires that to establish the new and contemporaneous
consideration defense, more than mere legal consideration must be given. The
consideration must be new and contemporaneous.
II.

The purpose of the "new and contemporaneous consideration" defense is to

protect contemporaneous transfers, not transfers that are on account of antecedent debts.
Thus, the defense comes into play only when a creditor has given new value as a fair
exchange that has caused no diminution or depletion to the subsequent insolvent estate
5

that would be detrimental to other creditors.
III.

The District Court erred as a matter of law in applying the new and

contemporaneous consideration defense in this case. The policy behind the new and
contemporaneous defense is to allow companies to acquire goods and services even
though they may be close to liquidation. When a company acquires something "new" in
terms of goods or services, the estate is not diminished and Ihe policies of the preference
statute are not implicated. However, in this case CSX did not provide any "new" value to
SAIC and the payments that were made to CSX reduced the amount of assets available to
pay SAIC's creditors and policyholders.
CSX contended in the District Court that its forbearance from prosecuting a valid
claim and its a promise to forego future litigation which could have resulted in a
judgment constituted "new consideration" to SAIC. However, this argument has been
advanced by numerous other preference defendants and soundly rejected by the federal
courts. CSX's right to assert insurance claims against SAIC was a part of the bargain
struck when CSX paid its insurance premiums and SAIC agreed to provide insurance
coverage for the period between July 14, 1979 to July 31, 1982. By forbearing from
suing on its claims under the insurance policies, (whether for past, present or future
claims), CSX was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving "new" consideration
to SAIC.
In addition, there could be no "future" claims because the coverage period ended
in 1982 and no later insurance policies were ever provided to CSX by SAIC. Indeed,
prior to the time that the three transfers at issue in this case were made, CSX had actually
6

filed three separate lawsuits to enforce its prior demands. In each of those lawsuits, CSX
sued SAIC to recover damages resulting from all claims that existed under the insurance
policies. There would be no liability for "future" exposures because SAIC did not insure
CSX for any period after 1982.
Furthermore, the argument that a release constitutes new value, whether it covers
past, present, or future claims, has repeatedly been rejected by the courts for important
policy reasons. If a release resulting from settling a claim was new value, creditors
would rush to settle for cash at the first hint of a debtor's financial trouble. Those
creditors who successfully settle would likely receive more than they otherwise would
have.
Finally, in this case, CSX gave nothing that constituted new consideration to SAIC
to offset the clear depletion of SAIC s assets from SAIC's settlement payments totaling
$308,000 to CSX. CSX did not provide new goods or services to SAIC nor did it
otherwise add to SAIC's assets.
In addition to the fact that there was no "new" consideration, the consideration
paid by CSX was not "contemporaneous." The mere fact that CSX's claim was
compromised does not affect the time when the debt first arose and was owed by SAIC.
Rather, the later settlement was inextricably tied to and related back to the earlier claims
that arose during the insurance coverage period of 1979 to 1982 and did not give rise to
any new "debt." At the very least, CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose
when the last complaint in the asbestos coverage litigation was filed against SAIC in
January of 1990.
7

Moreover, even assuming that the settlement agreement was somehow
"contemporaneous" with SAIC's liabilities, the settlement payments themselves were not
made contemporaneously with the settlement agreement. Thus, the District Court erred
as a matter of law.
IV.

Finally, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment summary

judgment in favor of CSX because CSX did not offer any evidence that allocated any
monetary value to SAIC from a release of future claims or that distinguished between the
consideration for a release of future claims and the release of past and present claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CSX SATISFIED
THE ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH THE NEW AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE.
The purpose of the preference provisions in the Utah Insurance Code is to treat all

similarly situated creditors of an insolvent insurance the same. The legislature
recognized that sometimes when insurance companies are on the verge of liquidation,
certain creditors may be preferred and receive payment from the insolvent insurance
company. Whether such preferences are intentional or not, the legislature has determined
that such payments should be brought back into the estate and that the assets of the estate
should be divided equally among all similarly situated creditors. The legislature,
however, provided an exception for cases in which a party provides an insurance
company with new and contemporaneous consideration for a payment. In such cases, the
value of the estate is not diminished and the transaction is therefore not voidable.

8

In this case, the District Court granted CSX's motion for summary judgment based
upon the application of the new and contemporaneous consideration defense set forth in
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4). The court stated in pertinent part in its memorandum
decision as follows:
In the instant case, it is undisputed the Settlement Agreement
between SAIC and CSX released CSX's existing and future claims. This,
in addition [to] the consideration noted by CSX in their memorandum in
support of their motion, leads to the conclusion the payments received by
CSX were for new and contemporaneous consideration. Accordingly, as a
matter of law, the Liquidator's ability to avoid the payments is foreclosed
and summary judgment in favor of CSX is appropriate.
(R.623.)
Two reasons are identified by the District Court to support its conclusion that the
new and contemporaneous consideration defense applied to bar the Liquidator's claims
against CSX. First, the District Court was persuaded that CSX's release of "future"
claims against SAIC in the October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter constituted new and
contemporaneous consideration. Second, the District Court was persuaded that because
CSX had foregone its right to (1) obtain a judgment against SAIC, (2) appeal any errors
that occurred at trial, and (3) execute on that judgment and save the expenses of litigation
by entering into the settlement agreement, this also constituted new and contemporaneous
consideration.
As explained below, the District Court erred as a matter of law in determining that
CSX gave new and contemporaneous consideration to SAIC in exchange for the
$308,000 in payments it received. The Utah statute at issue requires that to establish the
new and contemporaneous consideration defense, more than mere legal consideration
9

must be given.2 In other words, to come within the scope of the defense, CSX had to
establish that in exchange for the payments it received, it gave "a new and
contemporaneous consideration" to SAIC under Utah Code Annotated § 31A-27321(4)(a). As a matter of law, neither CSX's willingness to forbear pursuing its claims
against SAIC to judgment, nor its release of SAIC's pre-existing liability to CSX,
whether relating to past, present, or future claims under its insurance policies with SAIC,
constituted new consideration or contemporaneous consideration under Utah's statute.
Therefore, the District Court's decision must be reversed and this case remanded to the
District Court so that partial summary judgment can be entered in favor of the
Liquidator.3

II.

THE NEW AND CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE IS
DESIGNED TO PROTECT CONTEMPORANEOUS TRANSFERS AND
NOT TRANSFERS MADE TO PAY ANTECEDENT DEBTS
The Liquidator is not aware of any Utah cases construing the new and

contemporaneous consideration defense set forth in Utah's Insurance Code. However,
this defense is comparable to the federal Bankruptcy Code's "contemporaneous exchange
for new value" defense to a bankruptcy preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1).
The policy underlying the preference doctrine is "to prevent creditors from obtaining

2

The case cited by the District Court in support of its decision establishes merely that a
release can constitute legal consideration. However, the question in this case is not
whether the settlement agreement was supported by adequate consideration. Rather, the
question is whether the consideration that was given was "new" and "contemporaneous."
3

Summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator would be partial because the District
Court would still need to rule on the question of whether SAIC was insolvent at the time
of the payments to CSX.
10

satisfaction of their claims on the eve of liquidation to the detriment of other similarly
situated creditors." Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321,
324 (7th Cir. 1992). Because the policy underlying the preference doctrine under state
insurance liquidation law is the same as that under federal bankruptcy law, "it is
customary to look to federal bankruptcy law for guidance" when a voidable preference
dispute exists in a state insurance liquidation case. Pine Top Ins. v. Bank of America
Nat. Trust & Sav., 969 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1992).
The "contemporaneous exchange for new value" defense comes into play when a
creditor has given new value as a fair exchange that has caused no diminution or
depletion to the subsequent bankruptcy estate that would be detrimental to other
creditors. In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371, 376 (N.D. 111. 1985). One of the
leading treatises on bankruptcy law explains that this defense was meant to protect
exchanges of property that might otherwise be considered credit transactions when the
transactions were actually contemporaneous transfers. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy §
547.04[l][a] at p. 547-44 (15th Ed. 2001). Collier cites the legislative history underlying
this defense which states as follows:
The [contemporaneous exchange] exception is a simple one,
excepting a transfer that is really not on account of an antecedent debt...
No doubt a purchase by the debtor of goods or services with a check, if
deemed to be on credit by state law, would be insulated by this exception.
Though strictly speaking the transaction may be a credit transaction
because the seller does not receive payment until the check is cleared
through the debtor's bank, it is generally considered and intended to be a
contemporaneous transaction, and assuming the check is promptly
deposited and cleared, is in fact substantially contemporaneous. [Citation
omitted].
11

Id. at p. 547-44 n.7.
III.

CSX PROVIDED NEITHER NEW NOR CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSIDERATION TO SAIC IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PAYMENTS
RECEIVED
The policy behind the new and contemporaneous defense is to allow companies to

acquire goods and services even though they may be close to liquidation. When a
company acquires something "new" in terms of goods or sendees, the estate is not
diminished and the policies of the preference statute are not implicated. However, in this
case, as shown below, CSX did not provide any "new" value to SAIC and the payments
that were made to CSX reduced the amount of assets available to pay SAIC's creditors
and policyholders. Further, as also shown below, the consideration provided by CSX was
not contemporaneous, and the District Court therefore erred in granting CSX's motion for
summary judgment.
A.

No "New" Consideration Was Provided to SAIC by CSX.
1.

CSX's Agreement to Forbear from Pursuing SAIC to Judgment by
Settling the Cases Did Not Constitute New Consideration.

CSX contended in the District Court that its forbearance from prosecuting a valid
claim and its a promise to forego future litigation which could have resulted in a
judgment constituted "new consideration" to SAIC. (R. 534-537.) However, this
argument has been advanced by numerous other preference defendants and soundly
rejected by the federal courts. For example, in In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. 371
(N.D. 111. 1985), the court held that the creditor's forbearance from obtaining an
immediate judgment against the debtor did not enhance the debtor's estate and was not
12

"new value" to the debtor's estate. The Ottawa Cartage court compared this forbearance
argument to the forbearance argument in an earlier Ohio bankruptcy decision, where the
Ohio bankruptcy court rejected the notion that a creditor's forbearance from exercising its
rights under a lease were "new value" to the debtor:
First, [creditor] gave nothing "new" to the debtor. [Creditor's] right to
evict or not to evict upon default by [debtor] was a part of the bargain
struck when the lease was executed. By forbearing from evicting [debtor],
[creditor] was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving "new
value."
Id. at 376, quoting. In re Lario, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
Similarly, in In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994), a
supplier of aircraft parts to a bankrupt debtor was sued for pre-petition preferential
payments made to the supplier. The supplier had sued the debtor pre-petition to recover
payments for earlier shipments to the debtor, and sought to attach the debtor's assets.
The parties settled the lawsuit, and as part of the settlement, the debtor shipped goods
back to the supplier. When the supplier was later sued for the value of the shipped goods
as a preference, the supplier argued that it gave new value to the debtor by agreeing to
forbear from pursuing its attachment motion against the debtor. The bankruptcy court
rejected this argument, concluding that the forbearance of asserting legal rights does not
constitute "new" value to a debtor. Id, at 138-39, citing In re Air Conditioning, Inc. of
Stuart, 845 F.2d 293, 298 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 993, 109 S.Ct. 557
(1988); In re Jet Floridav System, Inc., 841 F.2d 1082, Drabkin v. A.L Credit Corp., 800
F.2d 1153, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986); In re Thomas McKinnon Securities Inc., 125 B.R.
94, 97-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 80 B.R. 517; Matter of
13

Installation Services, Inc., 101 B.R. 282, 285 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989; Van Huffel Tube
Corp. v. A & G Indus.. 74 B.R. 579, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Bavely v. Merchants
Naf IBank, 36 B.R. 582, 584 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Matter of Duffy, 3. B.R. 263,
265-66 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Likewise in this case, CSX's right to assert insurance claims against SAIC was a
part of the bargain struck when CSX paid its insurance premiums and SAIC agreed to
provide insurance coverage for the period between July 14, 1979 to July 31, 1982. By
forbearing from suing on its claims under the insurance policies, (whether for past,
present or future claims), CSX was merely exercising a pre-existing right, not giving
"new" consideration to SAIC.
2.

CSX's Execution of a Release of "Future" Claims Against
SAIC Did Not Constitute New Consideration.

The District Court concluded that the "new and contemporaneous consideration"
defense applied because CSX released SAIC from "future" claims in the October 14,
1991 Settlement Letter. (R. 623.) However, as a matter of law, there could be no
"future" claims because the coverage period ended in 1982 and no later insurance
policies were ever provided to CSX by SAIC. Indeed, prior to the time that the three
transfers at issue in this case were made, CSX had actually filed three separate asbestos
coverage litigation lawsuits to enforce its prior demands. In each of those lawsuits, CSX
sued SAIC to recover damages resulting from all claims that existed under the insurance
policies and CSX acknowledged in each of the lawsuits that it "anticipated additional
asbestos related bodily injury lawsuits may be filed" against it. (R. 391, 404, 447.) The
14

exact amount of damages may not have been known by CSX at the time it filed the
lawsuits, but according to its CSX's own allegations, SAIC's liability had already
attached. In other words, CSX alleged that during the period from 1979 to 1982 there
had been exposure to asbestos and that this rendered SAIC liable. There would be no
liability for "future" exposures because SAIC did not insure CSX for any period after
1982.
Furthermore, the argument that a release constitutes new value, whether it covers
past, present, or future claims, has repeatedly been rejected by the courts and for good
reason. As explained in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 997, 1003 (7 Cir.
1987):
If a release (and possible "goodwill") resulting from settling a claim was new
value bringing the settlement payment within the contemporaneous exchange
exception, creditors would rush to settle for cash at the first hint of the debtor's
financial trouble rather than wait and pursue a claim in bankruptcy. Those
creditors who successfully settle will likely receive more than they otherwise
would have, leaving less for the creditors who do not successfully settle. This
would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to deter creditors from dismembering
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy and to promote equity among creditors.
[Citation omitted]. Congress certainly did not intend the contemporaneous
exchange exception to achieve such a result.
Likewise in this case, if the application of the new and contemporaneous
consideration defense is upheld, one of the vital purposes behind Utah's insurance
liquidation statute will be frustrated, i.e. to treat similarly situated creditors equally and to
discourage creditors from "dismembering" an insolvent insurance company.

15

3.

No Goods, Services, or Money Was Provided to SAIC by CSX that
Would Constitute New Consideration.

"The well-accepted purpose of the 'contemporaneous exchange for new value
exception to the preference rules is to enable a debtor to procure necessary goods and
services during the precarious period before the debtor files bankruptcy". In re Pan
Trading Corporation, S.A., 125 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). In this case, CSX
gave nothing that constituted new consideration to SAIC to offset the clear depletion of
SAIC's assets from SAIC's settlement payments totaling $308,000 to CSX. CSX did not
provide new goods or services to SAIC nor did it otherwise add to SAIC's assets. CSX
also did not pay any additional premiums to SAIC in 1991 in return for new insurance
coverage. CSX only received what it had previously bargained for, Le., payment on preexisting covered insurance claims. CSX's rights against SAIC for insurance coverage
and insurance payments (whether for past, present, or future claims) arose because CSX
and its predecessors had paid SAIC insurance premiums many years ago in return for
SAIC's agreement to provide insurance coverage for any claims arising during the
coverage period. CSX did not give SAIC any "new consideration" just because it agreed
to settle with SAIC long after the coverage period had passed. SAIC already had the
obligation to provide insurance coverage to CSX during the coverage period.
B.

No Contemporaneous Consideration was Provided by CSX to SAIC.

As established above, while there may have been "legal" consideration for the
settlement agreement between SAIC and CSX, this consideration was not "new." In
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addition, for the reasons set forth below, the consideration provided by CSX was also not
contemporaneous, as required by the statute.
1.

The Payments Made by SAIC to CSX Were to Satisfy Antecedent
Debts and Thus Could Not Have Constituted Contemporaneous
Consideration.

The public policy behind the new and contemporaneous consideration defense is
"to protect 'transfers that [are] not really on account of an antecedent debt.9 In re Energy
Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the defense does not
fit in this case because the payments made by SAIC to CSX were clearly on account of
an antecedent debt. In other words, SAIC and CSX were not engaging in a
contemporaneous transaction but were settling a pre-existing business obligation. The
mere fact that CSX's claim was compromised does not affect the time when the debt first
arose and was owed by SAIC. See In re Upstairs Gallery, Inc., 167 B.R. 915, 918 (9th
Cir. BAP 1993). Rather, the later settlement was inextricably tied to and related back to
the earlier claims that arose during the insurance coverage period of 1979 to 1982 and did
not give rise to any new "debt." See ^g. Buggage v. Yellow Checker Cab Co., 623 So.2d
906, 907 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (.. ."a settlement is merely the method in which a claim is
negotiated and satisfied by the parties prior to trial. The fact that a claim is agreed to
immediately by the insurer, or negotiated over a period of time, does not negate the fact
that the claim arose out of the insurance policy and is therefore a 'covered claim'

").

In this case, CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose by the end of the
coverage periods under the insurance policies issued by SAIC. The unambiguous
language of the insurance policies provides that SAIC was liable for excess railroad
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liability and auto liability, personal injury, property damage, employers liability (FELA),
workers compensation and occupational diseases for three separate periods beginning on
July 14, 1979, and ending on July 31, 1982. Following the expiration of this coverage
period, all of the events necessary to give rise to a claim or cause of action under the
insurance policies issued by SAIC would have necessarily occurred and any liability on
the part of SAIC would have attached by July 31, 1982. Indeed, CSX not only alleged
that liability had attached, it filed lawsuits against SAIC on that basis.
Even if the specific events giving rise to liability under the insurance policies may
have been unknown by SAIC and CSX, or had yet to manifest themselves by the end of
the coverage period, this still would not change the conclusion that CSX had existing
claims against SAIC on July 31, 1982. It is well settled under Utah's Insurance Code that
contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated obligations create claims under Utah's
preference statute. The Utah Insurance Code's definition of "creditor" includes an
insured having any claim against its insurer, whether the claims be matured, unmatured,
liquidated, unliquidated, secured, unsecured, absolute, fixed, or contingent. Utah Code
Annotated § 31-1-301(21) (1999)4. This definition dictates that even though the full
extent of a claim may not be known until a future point in time, it is nevertheless an
antecedent debt.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the contingent nature of CSX's
covered insurance claims were deemed too "unknown" to be antecedent debts of SAIC at

4

This definition, which has not been amended other than to add subparagraphs, now
appears at Utah Code Annotated § 31A-1-301(24) (1999).
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the end of the coverage period in July of 1982, at the very least, the District Court should
have found that CSX's claims and SAIC's corresponding debt arose at the very latest
when the last complaint in the asbestos coverage litigation was filed against SAIC in
January of 1990. For example, in In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1991), the court held that allegations contained in a complaint which asserted a right to
payment were sufficient to have constituted a claim. The court went on to state that
"[t]he fact that such antecedent debt was not reduced to judgment prior to the transfer . . .
[was], of course, irrelevant. It [was] sufficient that the claim was contingent or disputed."
Id.
In each of the asbestos coverage litigation complaints, CSX alleged that
substantial premiums had been expended to purchase the liability policies from SAIC and
that all applicable conditions precedent under the policies had been met. (R. 314-316,
391, 404, 447.) Additionally, each of the asbestos coverage litigation complaints alleged
that SAIC was obligated under the insurance policies to pay in full all sums to which the
insured plaintiffs could become liable, through judgment, settlement, or otherwise. (R.
314-316, 392, 405,449.) Accordingly, as a matter of law, SAIC's debts to CSX are
deemed to have arisen no later than January 11, 1990, the date on which CSX filed the
last of the three asbestos coverage complaints against SAIC.
Further support for the Liquidator's position in this matter is found in the
numerous bankruptcy decisions dealing with the concept of "antecedent debt." Although
the Utah Insurance Code does not define the term "antecedent debt," several bankruptcy
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courts have stated that a debt5 is antecedent if it is incurred before the transfer. See e.g.
In re Ogden, 243 B.R. 104, 111-112 (10th Cir. BAP 2000) (an antecedent debt exists if the
creditor had a claim against the debtor before the transfers in question or if the creditor
would be able to assert a claim against the bankrupt's estate if the payment had not been
made); In re Miniscribe Corp., 123 B.R. 86, 90 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
In addition, the cases also make clear that claims, which arise in the future,
constitute "antecedent" debts. For instance, in In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d
997,1001 (7 Cir. 1987), the court held that when a creditor has a claim against a debtor,
even if it is unliquidated, unfixed, or contingent, the debtor has still incurred a debt. See
also In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1996) (husband's future spousal support
obligations that were to be paid in the future constituted antecedent debts for preference
purposes under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Olson, 66 B.R. 687 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986)
(father's future child support obligations that were to be paid in the future constituted
antecedent debts for preference purposes under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Hudson
Valley Quality Meats, Inc., 29 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982).
2.

CSX's Agreement to Release SAIC From Liability For All Claims
Arising Under the Insurance Policy Was Not Contemporaneously
Made In Exchange for the Payments CSX Received from SAIC.

In addition, even assuming that the settlement agreement was somehow
"contemporaneous" with SAIC's liabilities, the settlement payments themselves were not
made contemporaneously with the settlement agreement. Thus, the District Court erred

5

The Tenth Circuit has stated "that a debt is incurred when a debtor first becomes legally
obligated to pay . . . . " In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1986).
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as a matter of law. For example, in In re Barefoot, 952 F.2d 795 (4m Cir. 1991), wire
transfers to a creditor sent on May 13, May 29, and June 3, 1987, that replaced a
dishonored check received by the creditor on April 20, 1987, were deemed to not be
contemporaneous exchanges, even though the creditor's release of collateral in exchange
for the check, if it had been honored, might have been contemporaneous. "The exception
for a contemporaneous exchange does not ordinarily apply to credit transactions, and the
dishonor of a check inevitably creates an antecedent debt owed by the debtor which any
subsequent payments to make good the check, no matter how quickly made, would be
satisfying." Id at 800.
Likewise, in In re Pan Trading Corporation, S.A.J25 B.R. 869 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991), the court held that settlement payments that were not made at the time of the
settlement agreement were not "contemporaneous." In that case, the debtor was sued by
the New York City Housing Department on long-standing housing code violations. The
parties settled their lawsuit, and the debtor made installment payments to the department.
When the department was sued for a return of the payments as a preference, it argued that
it accepted the payments as new value in exchange for its implicit agreement to refrain
from suing the debtor. The court rejected this argument, concluding that "successive
forbearances from continuing a lawsuit does not create new value." Id. at 876. The
court also concluded that the settlement payments, which were paid between June 24 and
July 10, 1987 (the consent order settling the lawsuit was signed by the parties on May 11,
1987), were not contemporaneous payments:
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The payments in the instant case bear none of the earmarks of a
contemporaneous exchange. The parties to the litigation settled upon a
penalty to cure violations and then they set forth a schedule for payment.
There was no new consideration, no contemporaneous exchange for new
value, only payment upon an antecedent debt to satisfy a fine on longstanding violations.
Id at 876-77.
In the Ottawa Cartage case, the debtor settled with certain creditors (the trustees of
a pension fund) who had sued the debtor in March of 1982, and the debtor agreed that it
would sell certain assets and turn over the proceeds to the creditors. The creditors were
paid on April 28, 1982. When the creditors were sued for a return of the proceeds as a
preference, the creditors argued that they had given "new value" by their forbearance
from pursuing their lawsuit, and that the new value was given in a "substantially
contemporaneous exchange." The court rejected the argument that there was a
contemporaneous exchange:
At the outset, even taking [the creditors'] argument at face value, the
"exchange" was not "substantially contemporaneous." [The creditors']
"forbearance" began at the latest in March 1982 when [the debtor] and [the
creditors] signed the Agreement (Ex. E). [The debtor] made its promise of
future payment then, and its payment was made nearly a month later. [The
creditors] have presented no evidence the parties intended a
contemporaneous exchange of new value for money, and the one-month
hiatus between the forbearance and the payment indicates the transaction
was not "in fact" substantially contemporaneous.
In re Ottawa Cartage, Inc., 55 B.R. at 376.
Likewise, the delay from the date on which CSX and SAIC first agreed to a
settlement in August of 1991 and the actual payments which were made by three checks
dated October 28, 1991, November 26, 1991 and January 2, 1992, also defeats the
22

argument that the transfers by SAIC constituted "contemporaneous" consideration for
CSX's earlier agreement to settle.
IV.

FINALLY, CSX SHOULD NOT HAVE PREVAILED ON ITS NEW AND
CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSIDERATION DEFENSE BECAUSE IT
FAILED TO OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT ALLOCATES ANY
MONETARY VALUE TO THE FUTURE CLAIMS THAT WERE
RELEASED
Finally, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CSX

because CSX did not offer any evidence that allocated any monetary value to SAIC from
a release of future claims or that distinguished between the consideration for a release of
future claims and the release of past and present claims. As noted by the court in AeroFastener, a creditor relying on the new value exception in the Bankruptcy Code "must
show that the value given for the transfer of the debtor's property must actually and in
real terms enhance the worth of the debtor's estate so as to offset the reduction in the
estate that the transfer caused." In re Aero-Fastener, Inc., 177 B.R. at 138. In addition, a
creditor relying on the new value exception must show "something of tangible economic
value," id. at 137, as well as "a specific dollar valuation" of the new value received by the
debtor, in order to qualify for the new value defense. This is critical because a new
consideration defense is only intended to protect transfers "to the extent that the creditor
can show that the value given to the creditor equals the value the debtor received. For
instance, as explained in the bankruptcy context, if the debtor transfers $50,000 to the
creditor in exchange for the release of a lien of $30,000, the difference of $20,000 is not
protected from avoidance under the contemporaneous exchange exception." 5 Collier on
Bankruptcy § 547.04[l][a] at p. 547-44 (15th Ed. 2001).
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CSX's failure to offer any evidence showing a specific dollar valuation of the
release of future claims as well as its failure to show that releeising future claims brought
any tangible economic value to SAIC's estate are also a basis for rejecting CSX's defense
of "new and contemporaneous consideration" as a matter of law. Indeed, if CSX's future
claims "may never in fact actually arise," as alleged by CSX, then such claims would be
illusory, and there would be no consideration for a release of such future claims. Thus,
for this reason as well, the District Court erred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment entered by the
District Court in favor of CSX Corporation and remand the case so that partial summary
judgment may be entered in favor of the Liquidator.
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an insurer ordered to be rehabilitated or liquidated under this
chapter, which is fraudulent under this section, may be
avoided by the rehabilitator or liquidator, except for a person
who in good faith is a purchaser, lienor, or obligee for a present
fair consideration, and except t h a t any purchaser, lienor, or
obligee, who in good faith has given a consideration which is
less t h a n fair for such transfer, lien, or obligation, may retain
the property, lien, or obligation as security for repayment. The
court may, on due notice, order t h a t any such transfer or
obligation be preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which
event t h e rehabilitator or liquidator on repayment succeeds to
and may enforce the rights of the purchaser, lienor, or obligee.
(2) (a) A transfer of property other than real property is
considered to be made or allowed when it becomes so far
perfected t h a t no subsequent lien obtainable by legal or
equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee u n d e r Subsection
31A-27-32K3).
(b) A transfer of real property is considered to be made
or allowed when it becomes so far perfected t h a t no
subsequent bona fide purchaser from t h e insurer could
obtain rights superior to the rights of the transferee.
(c) A transfer which creates an equitable lien is not
considered to be perfected if there are available m e a n s by
which a legal lien could be created.
(d) For the purposes of this section, any transfer which
is not perfected prior to the filing of a petition for rehabilitation or liquidation is considered to be made immediately before the filing of the successful petition.
(e) Subsection (2) applies whether or not there are or
were creditors who might have obtained any liens or
persons who might have become bona fide purchasers.
(f) For the purposes of Subsection (2), a transfer is not
m a d e until the insurer has acquired rights in the property
transferred.
(3) (a) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings
upon a simple contract is one arising in the ordinary
course of these proceedings upon t h e entry or docketing of
a judgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment,
execution, or similar process, whether before, upon, or
after the judgment or decree and whether before or upon
levy. It does not include liens which, under applicable law,
a r e given a special priority over other liens which are
prior in time.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (2), a lien obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings may become "superior to
t h e rights of a transferee," or a purchaser may obtain
"rights superior to t h e rights of a transferee,'' if the
superior rights follow only from t h e lien or purchase itself,
or from the lien or purchase followed by any step wholly
within the control of the respective lienholder or purchaser, with or without the aid of ministerial action by
public officials. A lien or purchase is not considered
superior for purposes of Subsection (2) if the lien or
purchase superiority can be obtained only through acts
subsequent to the obtaining of t h e Hen or subsequent to
t h e purchase which require the agreement or concurrence
of any third party or which require any further judicial
action or ruling.
(4) Any transaction of the insurer with a reinsurer is
considered fraudulent and may be avoided by t h e rehabilitator
or liquidator under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the transaction consists of the termination, adjustment, or settlement of a reinsurance contract in which the
reinsurer is released from any p a r t of its duty to pay the
originally specified share of losses that h a d occurred prior
to the time of the transaction, unless the reinsurer gives
a present fair consideration for t h e release; and
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(b) any p a r t of t h e transaction took place within one
year prior to the date of filing of the petition p u r s u a n t to
which the rehabilitation or liquidation was commenced.
(5) An action or proceeding under this section m a y not be
commenced after the earlier of:
(a) two years after t h e appointment of a rehabilitator
under Section 31A-27-303 or a liquidator u n d e r Section
31A-27-310; or
(b) the date the rehabilitation is terminated under
Subsection 31A-27-306(2) or the liquidation is terminated
under Section 31A-27-339.
1986
31A-27-321. Voidable p r e f e r e n c e s a n d liens.
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference" means a transfer of any of the property of an insurer to or for t h e benefit
of a creditor, for or on account of a n antecedent debt, made
or allowed by the i n s u r e r within one year before the filing
of a successful petition for rehabilitation or liquidation
under this chapter, t h e effect of which transfer may
enable the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his
debt t h a n another creditor of the same class would receive. If a liquidation order is entered while t h e insurer is
already subject to a rehabilitation order, transfers otherwise qualifying are considered to be preferences if they
are made or allowed within one year before t h e filing of
t h e successful petition for rehabilitation or within two
years before the filing of the successful petition for liquidation, whichever time is shorter.
(b) Any preference m a y be avoided by the rehabilitator
or liquidator, if:
(i) t h e insurer w a s insolvent at the time of the
transfer;
(ii) t h e transfer was m a d e within four months
before t h e filing of t h e petition;
(iii) t h e creditor receiving it or to be benefited by it
or his agent acting with reference to the transfer had,
a t the time when t h e transfer was made, reasonable
cause to believe t h a t the insurer was or w a s about to
become insolvent; or
(iv) t h e creditor receiving it was an officer, an
employee, an attorney, or other person who was in
fact in a position of comparable influence in t h e
i n s u r e r to a n officer, or any shareholder holding
directly or indirectly more t h a n 5% of a n y class of
equity security issued by the insurer, or any other
person with whom t h e insurer did not deal at arm's
length.
(c) Where the preference is voidable, the rehabilitator
or liquidator may recover the property or, if it h a s been
converted, its value, from any person who h a s received or
converted the property, except t h a t he may not recover
from a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of t h e debtor's
transferee for a present fair consideration. Where a bona
fide purchaser or lienor has given less than fair consideration, the bona fide purchaser or lienor has a lien upon t h e
property to the extent of the consideration actually given
by him. Where a preference by way of lien or security title
is voidable, the court may, on due notice, order the lien or
title to be preserved for t h e benefit of the estate, in which
event the lien or title passes to the liquidator.
(d) Any payment to which Subsection 31A-5-415(2)
applies is a preference and is voidable under Subsection
(l)(b) if it is made within the time period specified in
Subsection (l)(a), except that payments made by insurers
for t h e purchase of insurance u n d e r Section 16-10a-302
are not preferences.
(2) Subsection 31A-27-320(2) applies to the perfection of
transfers.
(3) Subsection 31A-27-320(3) applies to Hens by legal or
equitable proceedings.
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(4) The receiver may not avoid a transfer of property under
this section for or because of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt is incurred, of a debt incurred in the ordinary course of the
business of the insurer and according to normal business
terms;
(c) a transfer of a security interest in property to enable
the insurer to acquire the property and which is perfected
within ten days after the security interest attaches;
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor to the
extent that after the transfer, the creditor gave new value
not secured by an unavoidable security interest and on
account of which the insurer did not make an unavoidable
transfer to or for the benefit of the creditor; or
(e) a transfer of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the
extent that the aggregate of all of those types of transfers
to the transferee caused a reduction of the amount by
which the debt secured by the security interest exceeded
the value of the security interest four months prior to the
date of liquidation or any time subsequent to the liquidation.
(5) The receiver may avoid a transfer of property of the
insurer transferred to secure reimbursement of a surety that
furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien
that would have been avoidable by the receiver under Subsection (l)(b). The liability of the surety under the bond or
obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of the
property recovered by the receiver or the amounts paid to the
receiver.
(6) The property affected by any lien which is considered
voidable under Subsection (l)(b) and Subsection (5) is discharged from the lien, and that property and any of the
indemnifying property transferred to or for the benefit of a
surety passes to the rehabilitator or liquidator, except that the
court may, on due notice, order the lien to be preserved for the
benefit of the estate and the court may direct that a conveyance be executed which is adequate to evidence the title of the
rehabilitator or liquidator.
(7) The court has jurisdiction of any proceeding by the
rehabilitator or liquidator, to hear and determine the rights of
any parties under this section. Reasonable notice of any
hearing in the proceeding shall be given to all parties in
interest, including the obligee of a releasing bond or other
similar obligation. Where an order is entered for the recovery
of indemnifying property in kind or for the avoidance of an
indemnifying lien, the court, upon application of any party in
interest, shall in the same proceeding ascertain the value of
the property or lien, and if the value is less than the amount
for which the property is indemnity or than the amount of the
lien, the transferee or lienholder may elect to retain the
property or lien upon payment of its value, as ascertained by
the court, to the rehabilitator or liquidator within those
reasonable times as fixed by the court.
(8) The liability of a surety under a releasing bond or other
similar obligation is discharged to the extent of the value of
the indemnifying property recovered or the indemnifying lien
nullified and avoided or, where the property is retained under
Subsection (7) to the extent of the amount paid to the
rehabilitator or liquidator.
(9) If a creditor has been preferred and afterward in good
faith gives the insurer further credit without security of any
kind, for property which becomes a part of the insurer's estate,
the amount of the new credit remaining unpaid at the time of
the petition shall be setoff against the preference which would
otherwise be recoverable from him.
(10) If an insurer, directly or indirectly, within four months
before the filing of a successful petition for rehabilitation or
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liquidation under this chapter or at any time in contemplation
of a proceeding to rehabilitate or liquidate it, pays money or
transfers property to an attorney at law for services rendered
or to be rendered, the transaction may be examined by the
court on its own motion or shall be examined by the court on
petition of the rehabilitator or liquidator and shall be held
valid only to the extent the transfer is a reasonable amount as
determined by the court. The excess may be recovered by the
rehabilitator or liquidator for the benefit of the estate. If the
attorney meets the description in Subsection (l)(b)(iv), that
subsection applies in place of this subsection.
(11) (a) Every officer, manager, employee, shareholder,
member, subscriber, attorney, or any other person acting
on behalf of the insurer who knowingly participates in
giving any preference when he has reasonable cause to
believe the insurer is or is about to become insolvent at
the time of the preference, is personally liable to the
rehabilitator or liquidator for the amount of the preference. It is permissible to infer that there is reasonable
cause to so believe if the transfer was made within four
months before the date of filing the successful petition for
rehabilitation or liquidation.
(b) Every person receiving any property from the insurer or for the benefit of the insurer as a preference
which is voidable under Subsection (l)(b) is personally
liable for that transfer and property and is bound to
account to the rehabilitator or liquidator.
(c) This subsection does not prejudice any other claim
by the rehabilitator or liquidator against any person.
1992

31A-27-322. Recoupment from affiliates.
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in this state is
ordered under this chapter, the receiver appointed under the
order has a right to recover on behalf of the insurer from any
affiliate that controlled the insurer the amount of distributions, other than stock dividends paid by the insurer on its
capital stock, made at any time during the five years preceding the petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation.
This recovery is subject to the limitations of Subsections (2)
through (6).
(2) No dividend is recoverable if the recipient shows that,
when paid, the distribution was lawful and reasonable, and
that the insurer did not know and could not reasonably have
known that the distribution might adversely affect its solvency.
(3) The maximum amount recoverable under this section is
the amount needed, in excess of all other available assets, to
pay all claims under the receivership, reduced for each recipient by any amount the recipient has already paid to receivers
under similar laws of other states.
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the
insurer at the time the distributions were paid is Hable up to
the amount of distributions he received. Any person who was
an affiliate that controlled the insurer at the time the distributions were declared is liable up to the amount of distributions he would have received if they had been paid immediately. If two or more persons are liable regarding the same
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable.
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is insolvent, all
affiliates that controlled that person at the time the dividend
was declared or paid are jointly and severally Hable for any
resulting deficiency in the amount recovered from the insolvent affiHate.
(6) This section does not enlarge the personal liability of a
director under existing law.
(7) An action or proceeding under this section may not be
commenced after the earlier of:
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(15) "Certificate of authority" is included within the
term "license."
(16) "Claim," unless t h e context otherwise requires,
means a request or demand on an insurer for payment of
benefits according to the terms of an insurance policy.
(17) "Claims-made coverage" means an insurance contract or provision limiting coverage under a policy insuring against legal liability to claims t h a t are first made
against the insured while the policy is in force.
(18) (a) "Commissioner" or "commissioner of insurance" means Utah's insurance commissioner.
(b) When appropriate, the terms listed in Subsection (18)(a) apply to the equivalent supervisory official of another jurisdiction.
(19) (a) "Control," "controlling," "controlled," or "under
common control" means the direct or indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person. This control
m a y be:
(i) by contract;
(ii) by common management;
(iii) through t h e ownership of voting securities; or
(iv) by a means other t h a n those described in
Subsections (19)(a)(i) through (iii).
(b) There is no presumption t h a t an individual
holding a n official position with another person controls that person solely by reason of the position.
(c) A person having a contract or arrangement
giving control is considered to have control despite
t h e illegality or invalidity of the contract or arrangement.
(d) There is a rebuttable presumption of control in
a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls,
holds with the power to vote, or holds proxies to vote
10% or more of t h e voting securities of another
person.
(20) (a) "Corporation" means insurance corporation,
except when referring to:
(i) a corporation doing business as an insurance broker, consultant, or adjuster under:
(A) Chapter 23, Insurance Marketing —
Licensing Agents, Brokers, Consultants, and
Reinsurance Intermediaries; and
(B) Chapter 26, Insurance Adjusters; or
(ii) a noninsurer t h a t is part of a holding
company system under Chapter 16, Insurance
Holding Companies.
(b) "Stock corporation" means stock insurance corporation.
(c) "Mutual" or "mutual corporation" means a mut u a l insurance corporation.
(21) "Credit disability insurance" means insurance on a
debtor to provide indemnity for payments coming due on
a specific loan or other credit transaction while the debtor
is disabled.
(22) "Credit insurance" means surety insurance under
which mortgagees and other creditors are indemnified
against losses caused by the default of debtors.
(23) "Credit life insurance" means insurance on the life
of a debtor in connection with a loan or other credit
transaction.
(24) "Creditor" means a person, including an insured,
having any claim, whether:
(a) matured;
(b) unmatured;
(c) liquidated;
(d) unliquidated;
(e) secured;
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(f) unsecured;
(g) absolute;
(h) fixed; or
(i) contingent.
(25) (a) "Customer service representative" means a
person that provides insurance services and insurance product information:
(i) for its agent, broker, or consultant employer; and
(ii) to its employer's customer, client, or organization,
(b) A customer service representative may only
operate within the scope of authority of its agent,
broker, or consultant employer.
(26) "Deemer clause" means a provision u n d e r this title
under which upon the occurrence of a condition precedent,
the commissioner is deemed to have t a k e n a specific
action. If the statute so provides, the condition precedent
may be the commissioner's failure to t a k e a specific
action.
. (27) "Degree of relationship" means t h e number of
steps between two persons determined by counting the
generations separating one person from a common ancestor and t h e n counting t h e generations to t h e other person.
(28) "Department" means t h e Insurance Department.
(29) "Director" means a member of t h e board of directors of a corporation.
(30) "Disability insurance" means insurance written to:
(a) indemnify for losses and expenses resulting
from accident or sickness;
(b) provide payments to replace income lost from
accident or sickness; and
(c) pay for services resulting directly from accident
or sickness, including medical, surgical, hospital, and
other ancillary expenses.
(31) "Domestic insurer" means an insurer organized
under the laws of this state.
(32) "Domiciliary state" means the state in which an
insurer:
(a) is incorporated;
(b) is organized; or
(c) in the case of an alien insurer, enters into the
United States.
(33) "Employee benefits" means one or more benefits or
services provided employees or their dependents.
(34) (a) "Employee welfare fund" means a fund:
(i) established or maintained, whether directly or through trustees, by:
(A) one or more employers;
(B) one or more labor organizations; or
(C) a combination of employers and labor
organisations*, a n d
(ii) t h a t provides employee benefits paid or
contracted to be paid, other t h a n income from
investments of the fund, by or on behalf of an
employer doing business in this s t a t e or for the
benefit of any person employed in this state,
(b) "Employee welfare fund" includes a plan
funded or subsidized by user fees or t a x revenues.
(35) "Excludes" is not exhaustive and does not mean
t h a t other things are not also excluded. T h e items listed
are representative examples for use in interpretation of
this title.
(36) "Fidelity insurance" means insurance guaranteeing the fidelity of persons holding positions of public or
private trust.
(37) "First party insurance" means an insurance policy
or contract in which the insurer agrees to pay claims
submitted to it by the insured for the insured's losses.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT E. WILCOX, Liquidator of
Southern American Insurance
Company,
MEMORANDUM

DECISION

Plaintiff,
Case N o . 970902077
vs .
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
Court Clerk: Janet
CSX

Banks

CORPORATION,
March 1 2 , 2001
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
CSX

Corporations's

Liquidator's
Judgment
respect

Motion

Against

("CSX")

Motion

for Summary

Defendant.

for Summary

Judgment

The Court

Judgment

and for Partial
heard

to the motions on March 5, 2 0 0 1 .

oral

Following

and the
Summary

argument

with

the hearing,

the matters were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the m o t i o n s , m e m o r a n d a ,
attached
following

thereto

and for the good cause

exhibits

shown, hereby enters the

ruling.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, CSX argues the
payments

from Southern America

Insurance

Company

("SAIC") to CSX
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are not avoidable because SAIC made the payments to CSX in exchange
for new and contemporaneous consideration, which are not voidable
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321. 1
gave

valuable

consideration

in

In this case, CSX contends it
exchange

for

the

payments.

Specifically, such consideration included: accepting payment in an

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(4):
The receiver may not avoid a transfer of
property under this section for or because
of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt
is incurred, of a debt incurred in the
ordinary course of the business of the
insurer and according to normal business
terms ;
(c) a transfer of a security interest in
property to enable the insurer to acquire the
property and which is perfected within ten
days after the security interest attaches;
(d) a transfer to or for the benefit of a
creditor to the extent that after the
transfer, the creditor gave new value not
secured by an unavoidable security interest
and on account of which the insurer did not
make an unavoidable transfer to or for the
benefit of the creditor; or
(e) a transfer of a perfected security
interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that
the aggregate of all of those types of
transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction of the amount by which the debt
secured by the security interest exceeded the
value of the security interest four months
prior to the date of liquidation or any time
subsequent to the liquidation.
(Emphasis added).
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amount lower than that to which they were initially entitled,
losing their right to obtain an enforceable judgment, appeal any
errors occurring

at trial, and the right to obtain a writ of

execution on that judgment, and in so doing, CSX gave SAIC the
significant benefit of resolving this claim, avoiding a judgment
being entered against it, and saving the expense of litigation.
Additionally, CSX argues the Liquidator may not avoid the
payments because they were made within forty-five days after a debt
was incurred, they were made for a debt incurred in the ordinary
course of SAIC's insurance business, and because they were incurred
according to normal business terms

(arising via the settlement

agreement) and are not transfers pursuant to an antecedent debt.
Next, CSX contends summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator
is not appropriate because he has failed to show that the payments
were for an antecedent debt; it cannot be established as a matter
of law that with these payments CSX would have received a greater
benefit than similarly situated creditors, and there has been no
determination that SAIC was insolvent.
is no support

Finally, CSX argues there

for the Liquidator's assertion that prejudgment

interest is appropriate and such an award would be contrary to Utah
law.
The Liquidator opposes the motion and brings its own motion
for summary judgment arguing an element to establish a voidable

WILCOX v. CSX
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preference is thar one of the four requirements set forth in Utah
Code Annotated § 31A-27-321 (1) (b) (1991) is present. 2
motion,

the

Liquidator

contends

insolvency, can be established.

one

of

those

With this

elements,

Indeed, it is the

SAIC s

Liquidator's

position the Affidavit of Paul N. Shields establishes that SAIC's
qualified

assets

did

not

exceed

its

liabilities,

plus

minimum

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 which addresses
voidable preferences and liens:
(1) (a) As used in this chapter,
"preference" means a transfer of any of the
property of an insurer to or for the benefit
of a creditor, for or on account of an
antecedent debt, made or allowed by the
insurer within one year before the filing of
a successful petition for rehabilitation or
liquidation under this chapter, the effect of
which transfer may enable the creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
another creditor of the same class would
receive. If a liquidation order is entered
while the insurer is already subject to a
rehabilitation order, transfers otherwise
qualifying are considered to be preferences
if they are made or allowed within one year
before the filing of the successful petition
for rehabilitation or within two years before
the filing of the successful petition for
liquidation, whichever time is shorter.
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the
rehabilitator or liquidator, if:
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of
the transfer;
(ii) the transfer was made within four months
before the filing of the petition . . .
(Emphasis added).
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required capital, plus 30% of the compulsory surplus required to be
maintained by SAIC under the definition of "insolvency" in Utah
Code Annotated § 31A-1-301(39).

According to the Liquidator, the

Shields Affidavit also establishes that no material improvement
occurred in SAIC's financial condition between December 31, 1990
and March 25, 1992, the date the Liquidation Order was filed with
the Third Judicial District Court.

Based upon the forgoing, the

Liquidator argues the insolvency of SAIC, as defined in U.C.A. §
31A-1-301(39) between March 25, 1991 and March 25, 1992, has been
established and summary judgment on this element of a voidable
preference in its favor is appropriate.
Additionally, the Liquidator argues the Affidavit of Rheta
Beach is sufficient to establish the class of claims into which
CSX' s claim will fall and to establish that CSX will receive more
than other similarly situated creditors.
As to whether the payments to CSX were for an antecedent debt,
the Liquidator contends the language of the insurance policies
issued by SAIC provided coverage to CSX for three separate periods
beginning on July 14, 1979 and ending on July 31, 1982.
the

expiration

of

these

coverage periods,

all

of

Following
the

events

necessary to give rise to a claim or cause of action under those
policies had occurred.

According to the Liquidator, the October

14, 1991 Settlement Letter did not create the basis for SAIC's

WILCOX v. CSX
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liability to CSX, rather, the events that occurred while these
insurance policies were in effect created
liability.

the basis

for such

The October 14, 1991 Settlement Letter, asserts the

Liquidator, only memorialized the agreement as to the terms of
payment of that pre-existing debt.
With respect to the first two payments, it is the Liquidator's
position it need not establish that SAIC was insolvent because
those payments were made within four months of the filing of SAIC's
liquidation petition.

See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321(b).

Moreover, contends the Liquidator, CSX's argument that the
Liquidator's preference action is barred by the ordinary course
defense fails.

Specifically, it is the Liquidator's position that

the three payments by SAIC to CSX were made more than forty-five
days after the debt to CSX was incurred.

Indeed, Section I of the

Settlement Letter states:
In settlement of the Coverage Suits, the
parties
agree to the following
payment
provisions:
1.

Southern will pay CSX the sum of $308,000
as follows:
$102,667.00 on October 31, 1991
$102,667.00 on November 31, 1991
$102,667.00 on December 31, 1991

This sum shall be in full satisfaction of any
claims by CSX against the policies issued by
Southern for any losses due to Asbestos
Related Claims, past, present, or future,
whether or not asserted in Coverage Suits.

WILCOX v. CSX
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Further, argues the Liquidator, as a matter of law, the debt
arose during the coverage period of the insurance policies-they did
not accrue on the dates the payments were scheduled to be paid
under

the

Settlement

Letter.

Such

a position,

asserts

the

Liquidator, fails to take into account the fact that a later
compromise of a claim does not affect the time when the debt first
arises.

Finally, it is the Liquidator's position CSX offers no

evidence to support its argument that the debt to CSX was incurred
in the ordinary course of business of SAIC and according to normal
business terms within the insurance industry.

According to the

Liquidator, debts which are paid pursuant to a settlement agreement
are inherently not normal.
Lastly, as to prejudgment interest, the Liquidator contends
the Court can rule as a matter of law that it is entitled to
recovery of interest at the statutory rate of ten percent per annum
on the transfers recovered from and after March 25, 1994 through
the date judgment is rendered, and thereafter, at the statutorily
mandated post-judgment rate of interest.

Indeed, contends the

Liquidator, under Utah law, such interest is necessary to make the
prevailing party whole.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment

Paae 8

WILCOX v. CSX

MEMORANDUM DECISION

as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) .

XN

In considering a

summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in rhe
light

most

favorable

to

the

party

opposing

summary

judgment.

Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Cu. App.
1987) .
As noted, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321, which deals
with voidable preferences and liens:
(1) (a) As used in this chapter, "preference"
means a transfer of any of the property of an
insurer to or for the benefit of a creditor,
for or on account of an antecedent debt, made
or allowed by the insurer within one year
before the filing of a successful petition for
rehabilitation
or
liquidation
under
this
chapter, the effect of which transfer may
enable the creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than another creditor
of the
same
class would
receive. If a
liquidation order is entered while the insurer
is already subject to a rehabilitation order,
transfers otherwise qualifying are considered
to be preferences if they are made or allowed
within one year before the filing of the
successful petition for rehabilitation or
within two years before the filing of the
successful petition for liquidation, whichever
time is shorter.
(b) Any preference may be avoided by the
rehabilitator or liquidator, if:
(i) the insurer was insolvent at the time of
the transfer;
(ii) the transfer was made within four months
before the filing of the petition;

(Emphasis added).
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This having been said, however, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-321 (4)
provides:
The receiver may not avoid a transfer of
property under this section for or because of:
(a) a new and contemporaneous consideration;
(b) the payment, within 45 days after a debt
is incurred, of a debt incurred in the
ordinary course of the business of the insurer
and according to normal business terms;
In the instant case, it is undisputed the Settlement Agreement
between SAIC and CSX released CSX's existing and future claims.
This,

in

addition

the

consideration

noted

by

CSX

in

their

memorandum in support of their motion, leads to the conclusion the
payments

received

consideration.3

by

CSX

were

for

new

and

contemporaneous

Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Liquidator's

ability to avoid the payments is foreclosed and summary judgment in
favor of CSX is appropriate.
Based upon the forgoing ruling, the Court does not reach the
remaining

issues.

The

Liquidator's

motion

is, consequently,

denied.

3

Utah Courts have held that "consideration may be found
whenever a promissor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee
suffers a detriment, however slight, In re Estate of Beeslev, 883
P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994), and have long held that a release or
settlement of an unliquidated or disputed claim provides
sufficient consideration for a binding agreement. See Browning
v. Equitable Life Assur. S o c , 72 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1937).
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DATED th
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day

of March, 2001
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Case No. 940902077
C e r t i f i c a t e of

Mailing

I c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e 1 2 t h day of March, 2 0 0 1 , I s e n t by
f i r s t c l a s s m a i l a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of t h e a t t a c h e d document
to the following:
E. SCOTT SAVAGE
SAMUEL O. GAUFIN
50 SOUTH MIAN STREET,

SUITE 1250

SLC, UTAH 84144
BRENT D. WRIDE

ELAINE A. MUNSON
7 9 SOUTH MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 45385
SLC, UTAH 84145-0385

D i s t r i c t Court

Clerk

Deputy C l e r k

*Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this
proceeding should call (801)238-7300, at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
TDD phone for hearing impaired, (801)238-7391.

BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL
E. Scott Savage (2865)
Samuel 0. Gaufin (1170)
Eric K. Schnibbe (8463)
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 328-2200
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Attorneys for Defendant CSX Corporation
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT E. WILCOX, Liquidator of
Southern American Insurance Company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CSX CORPORATION,

ORDER GRANTING CSX
CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENTAND
DENYING THE LIQUIDATOR'S
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 940902077 CV

Defendant.

Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki

CSX Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Liquidator's motions for
summary judgment and partial summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on
March 5, 2001. The Liquidator was represented by Brent D. Wride and Elaine A. Mdnson.
CSX Corporation was represented by E. Scott Savage, Samuel O Gaufin, and Eric K.
Schnibbe. Having considered oral arguments and all memoranda and evidence submitted by
the parties on these motions, and having entered its Memorandum Decision of March 12,
2001, and for good cause shown,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CSX Corporation's motion for judgment is granted, and
that judgment be entered in favor of CSX Corporation and against the Liquidator on ail claims,
with prejudice and on the merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Liquidator's motion for summary judgment and
motion for partial summary judgment are denied.

DATED this

^

day of

,2001.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Brent D. Wride
Elaine A. M$nson
Attorneys for the Liquidator

E. Scott Savage
Samuel 0 . Gaufin
Eric K. Schnibbe
Attorneys for CSX Corporation
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF
JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, this

day of

E. Scott Savage
Samuel 0 . Gaufin
Eric K. Schnibbe
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC SAVAGE & CAMPBELL
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Brent D. Wride
Elaine A. Munson
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main St.
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

DISTRICT COURT CLERK:

By
Deputy Clerk
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, 2001, to:

